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CAN THE COMMON LAW ADEQUATELY
JUSTIFY A HOME TAPING ROYALTY USING
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ALONE?

Ramon E. Reyes, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past twenty years, the rapid development and spread of high
quality sound reproduction technology have caused a great deal of debate
within the United States copyright community.

With the advent of

recording devices capable of making high quality yet inexpensive and
unauthorized reproductions of copyrighted sound recordings, 1 scholars,

authors, and recording industry officials have lobbied for legislation that
would protect the interests of copyright owners. 2 These individuals called
for protection of copyrighted works in the form of a compulsory home
taping royalty or a surcharge on blank audio tape and recording devices.
At the same time, the recording technology industry, consumers
organizations, and even some scholars, urged Congress and the courts to
protect the right of the public to reproduce copyright protected sound
recordings for private use.'
These groups have argued that the
* Associate, O'Melveny & Myers, New York, N.Y.; B.S., Cornell University (1988);
J.D., Brooklyn Law School (1992); LL.M., New York University School of Law (1993).
Copyright © 1996 Ramon E. Reyes, Jr., all rights reserved. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author and not necessarily those of the law firm with which he is
associated.
1. E.g., Digital Audio Technology (DAT) consists of devices capable of making near
perfect digital copies of compact disks (CDs), phonographs (LPs), cassettes, and other
media. Digital audio recordings result in no additional distortion or noise in the copy,
unlike analog recordings.
See Douglas Reid Weimer, Digital Audio Recording
Technology: Challenges To American Copyright Law, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 455, 475-80
(1990).
2. See, e.g., Witnesses Hail Compromise Bill on Home Taping and DAT Royalties, 42
Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (DNA), 613, 614 (1991) [hereinafter Compromise Bill on
Home Taping].
3. See generally Barbara Ringer, Coypright in the 1980s, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
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unauthorized copying of protected sound recordings does not infringe upon
the rights of copyright owners or otherwise adversely affect the market for
prerecorded sound recordings. Herein lies the home taping controversy.
The home taping of sound recordings is the unauthorized reproduction
of copyright protected phonographs (LPs), prerecorded cassettes, 8-track
tapes, and compact disks (CDs), for the private use of the copyist. Home
taping must be distinguished from record piracy, which is the unauthorized
reproduction of sound recordings on a large scale and the subsequent sale
of the copies to the public. Although both home taping and record piracy
involve the unauthorized reproduction of copyright protected sound
recordings, the two situations need to be distinguished because of the way
each draws into conflict the interests of copyright owners and consumers.
In the case of record piracy, the legitimate interests of copyright owners
in the economic return from their labor conflict with the illegitimate
interests of the "pirates" to benefit financially from copying and
distributing a protected work. On the other hand, the conflict in home
taping situations is between the interest of copyright owners to receive an
additional economic benefit from their artistic or distributive effort and the
interest of consumers to make a copy of a lawfully purchased sound
recording for their private use. 4 In the instance of home taping, the
299, 303 (1976).
4. Some would argue that this is an oversimplification of the home taping controversy
because it does not take into account consumer to consumer distribution of home taped
copies of protected works. See generally Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio Taping of
Copyrighted Works and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: A CriticalAnalysis, 12
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 311 (1994). However, although consumer to consumer
distributions do occur, there is no reliable accounting of approximately how much exists.
Id. at 314 n.9. The lack of reliable information makes i't di'fict %.o faroT suth
distributions in the home taping analysis. As a result, recently enacted legislation in the
United States requires all digital audio recording devices to contain a copy protection
device that would prevent copying from a copy, and thus decrease the amount of consumer
to consumer distribution of hone taped works. See Audio Home Recording Act of 1992,
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1992)). Nevertheless, even taking into account
consumer to consumer distributions, my conclusion remains the same: the traditional
common law copyright principles of economic efficiency alone cannot adequately justify
a home taping royalty. See infra notes 140-65 and accompanying text.
It is also important to note that much of the international home taping legislation
specifically excludes consumer to consumer distribution of copies from the protection of
the exemption schemes. For example, in Australia, the home taping law states:
(1) Copyright... is not infringed by making on private premises a copy
of the sound recording if the copy is made on or after the proclaimed day on
a blank tape for the private and domestic use of the person who makes it.
(3) Where a copy of a sound recording made in reliance on subsection (1)
is used otherwise than for the private and domestic use of the person who made
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copyright owner has already benefited from the consumer's initial purchase
of the protected work, and a strong argument can be made that the
additional economic benefit is unwarranted.
Initially, the advent of home audio recording technology did not cause
copyright owners to be concerned with the unauthorized reproduction of
their works.' However, over time, copyright owners became concerned
with the effect of high quality reproductive technology on their
copyrighted works. As technological advances made the quality of home
taped copies better and less expensive, copyright owners claimed that this
caused a decrease in the potential market for their sound recordings. 6
Copyright owners argued that because the consuming public was able to
reproduce sound recordings more easily and at lower costs, the public
would spend less money purchasing record albums, prerecorded cassettes,
and CDs.7 This problem is exacerbated by the impending spread of digital

audio recording technology, 8 which allows the "home taper" to make
digital recordings from CDs, cassettes, or LPs that are far superior in
sound quality to those produced by older recording methods, e.g., analog. 9

it subsection (1) does not apply, and shall be taken never to have applied, to
the making of the copy.
Copyright Amendment Act 1989, ch. 32, § 135zzm (Austl.) (emphasis added). The law
excludes from the exemption copying for other than private and domestic use. This
includes, among other things: (1) selling the copy; (2) distributing the copy; (3) lending
the copy for hire; or, (4) causing the recording to be heard in public. Id. § 135zzk.
Therefore, even under a home taping scheme, consumer to consumer transactions are
copyright infringements. Consumers who conduct such transactions can be prosecuted,
even though such prosecution is difficult. By not including such transactions within the
ambit of the home taping exemption, legislators are stating that the home taping
controversy does not deal with such violations, only with the private home taping.
5. This was because the quality of these early home recordings was quite low. The
cost of buying a recording device capable of making a high quality sound recording was
too high for a large percentage of the consuming public, and buying albums and
prerecorded cassettes was more cost efficient. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Reforms
andInnovations RegardingAuthors and Performers' Rights in France:Commentary on the
Law of July 3, 1985, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 83 (1985) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Reforms].
6. For example, in the Republic of France, from 1978 to 1983 the number of LPs sold
decreased by approximately one-third. Id. at 94 (citing Assembl6e Nationale, Rapport de
la commission des lois No. 2235, at 12 (June 26, 1984)).
7. See Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 93 n.9.
8. For a discussion of the advent of digital audio tape, see McKuin, supra note 4, at
321-22.
9. Digital audio recording devices allow individuals to make copies of sound recordings
that are equal in audio quality to the original recording. With digital audio recording
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It is claimed that the spread of sound reproduction technology causes
serious problems in the international recording industry. 0 For example,
in France, about one-half of the homes owned audio reproduction devices
by 1983. " Simultaneously, the annual sales of LPs had decreased by about
one-third, 2 while annual sales of blank audio cassettes increased to
approximately $40 million by 1984.13 In the United States alone, the
recording industry estimates that the home taping of sound recordings
results in $1.5 billion of lost sales per year.' 4 The concerns of copyright
owners motivated many in the recording industry to lobby their legislatures
to examine the home taping situation and enact legislation to rectify the
problem.
The home taping of copyrighted sound recordings brings into conflict
the interest of the public in reproducing lawfully purchased recordings for
private enjoyment with the interest of copyright owners in receiving
additional compensation for creating and distributing such works. Home
taping laws are designed to balance those interests by imposing a small fee
for the purchase of blank audio tape and recording devices, and then
distributing the collected royalty for the benefit of copyright owners. In
common law countries, the conflict between copyright owners and
consumers may be resolved by using traditional copyright principles to
justify a statutory system of compulsory licensing or home taping royalties
for the taping of sound recordings. Under these traditional copyright

devices that are unequiped with copy protection, consumers can make an unlimited number
of near perfect copies of CDs, LPs, and cassettes. This form of recording is far superior
to the analog systems of the past. See Mary L. Mills, New Technology and the
Limitations of Copyright Law: An Argument for Finding Alternatives to Copyright
Legislation in an Era of Rapid Technological Change, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 307, 327
(1989).
10. Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 94.
11.

Id.at 95.

12. See id. at 94 (citing Assembl~e Nationale, Rapport de la commission des lois No.
2235 at 12 (June 26, 1984)).
13. See id. (citing Sdnat, Rapport de la commission sp~ciale No. 212, Vol. 3 at 22
(Mar. 20, 1985)).
14. NBS Nixes Proposed System to Prevent Copyright Violation by DAT Recorders,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 101, A-1 (Mar. 2, 1988). In 1982, economist
Alan Greenspan stated that overall retail losses from home taping were approximately
$1.05 billion in the United States. Diverse Groups Ask Supreme Court to Review Decision
Blocking Home Video Recording, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. tiri, A-1 (May
25, 1982). However, Jack Watman, senior vice president of the Consumer Electronics
Group of the Electronic Industries Association, argued that the decline in record sales is
equally attributable to changing lifestyles as it is to home taping. Id.
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principles, the focus of providing copyright protection is on the benefits
the public derives from the fruits of an author's creative effort.15 The
primary goal of copyright is to enhance the public welfare; economic
reward to the author is secondary. 16 In contrast, in civil law countries,
traditional copyright principles are focused on the rights of the author in
the work product, and the copyrighted work is viewed as an extension of
the author's personality. 1 7 The primary goal is to ensure the rights of the
author; public access to copyrighted works is a secondary concern.
While home taping royalty schemes may attempt to balance the
interests of copyright owners and the consuming public, there are
numerous problems associated with their use. First, home taping royalties
are an inefficient means of resolving the conflict between copyright owners
and consumers." The administrative costs of such schemes and the
problems associated with the appropriate distribution of the collected
royalties make them inefficient as a means of reconciling the competing
interests of copyright owners and consumers. Second, home taping
royalty schemes unfairly restrict the rights of noninfringing consumers of
blank audio tape and recording devices. 9 A large number of musicians,
composers, computer users, blind persons, and ordinary consumers use
blank audio tape in ways that do not infringe upon the rights of copyright
owners. It is patently unfair to require them to subordinate their interest
in privacy to the author's economic interest, upon which they are not even
infringing. Finally, home taping royalty schemes do not comport with the
traditional common law economic efficiency principle of copyright
protection."0 The incentive effects of a home taping royalty are minimal
at best, and there is no proof that the lack of a home taping royalty has
caused authors to stop, or even decrease, creating and distributing sound
recordings. These problems make the common law economic efficiency

15. See MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 1 (1989); Gary
Kauffman, Exposing the Suspicious Foundation of Society's Primacy in Copyright Law:
Five Accidents, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 381, 381-86 (1986) (quoting Sony Corp.
of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 469 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)). Throughout this
article the traditional common law copyright principles are referred to as "economic
efficiency "-giving authors an economic incentive to produce and distribute sound
recordings or other copyrighted material.
16. Kauffman, supra note 15, at 381.
17. Leaffer, supra note 15, at 2.
18. See Mills, supra note 9, at 330-34. See also infra notes 132-65 and accompanying
text.
19. See infra notes 187-95 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 136-65 and accompanying text.
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principle of copyright inadequate as the sole justification for a home taping
royalty.2" Nevertheless, home taping royalty schemes serve a useful
purpose-the protection of copyright owners' moral rights. Accordingly,
it is necessary to justify a home taping royalty using both the common law
economic efficiency principle as well as the civil law author's rights
principle.22
The balance of this article examines the adequacy of justifying a home
taping royalty using the traditional common law copyright principles. Part
II compares the copyright principles of common and civil law countries.
Part III presents a representative sample of the current legislative solutions
to the home taping problem used in civil law and common law countries.
Part IV then discusses the shortcomings of home taping royalty schemes
when analyzed under traditional common law copyright principles. This
section analyzes the specific problems of a home taping royalty and the
general inadequacy of economic analysis as a means of determining
copyright policy. Finally, Part V argues that the economic efficiency
principle is not an adequate justification for requiring consumers to pay a

21. It is necessary to draw a distinction between economic efficiency and author's
rights because common law countries recognize only economic efficiency as the
justification for copyright protection. Professor Alfred Yen observes that
[uInder the economic copyright model, the propriety of copyright's expansion
rests solely on an economic cost-benefit calculation. Courts should allow
copyright to expand as long as the benefits of increased creative activity
outweigh its costs. If we are serious about the exclusion of other property
theories from copyright jurisprudence, no other considerations are relevant.
Even though the concepts of fairness, equity and justice might suggest
directions in which to proceed, we must ignore them in favor of economic
analysis.
Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIo
ST. L.J. 517, 520 (1990) (emphasis added). Professor Yen criticizes the traditional
economic copyright model and would probably agree with this author that when deciding
the home taping issue, common law nations need to consider equity, fairness, and natural
law. Economic analysis is simply inadequate as the sole justification for a home taping
royalty. See id. at 520-46.
22. This article is in no way making a negative assessment of the need for home taping
royalties. In fact, such royalties are a beneficial protection device because they allocate
the costs of unauthorized reproduction of protected sound recordings, protect the rights
of authors, and enable consumers to "home tape" without the threat of prosecution.
However, this type of protection cannot be justified by the common law economic
efficiency principle alone because the systems of protection are not economically efficient
and infringe upon the rights of innocent purchasers of audio recording devices and tape.
Using the natural law, or author's rights principle, allows a legislature to justify an
economically inefficient royalty which infringes upon the rights of a class of consumers
but protects the rights of authors.
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compulsory home taping royalty. A home taping royalty, or compulsory
license fee, can only be adequately justified using the copyright principles
of both the common law and civil law world-economic efficiency and
natural law.
II. TRADITIONAL COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW
COPYRIGHT PRINCIPLES

Copyright legislation throughout the world covers a wide variety of
issues. These issues range from the subject matter of copyright to the
scope and duration of the copyright protection. 3 The substance of a
nation's copyright legislation depends largely on its jurisprudential
heritage.2 4 While many countries afford many of the same types of
protection, there are some differences between the types of protection
afforded in common law versus civil law countries.2 " These differences
arise due to the basic principles of copyright law in the two types of
nations.
In the common law world, copyright protection is perceived as a way
of encouraging the creation and dissemination of artistic works.26 The first
copyright statute, the Statute of Anne, was passed in 1710 by the British
Parliament.2 7

Parliament enunciated the policy that has become the

23. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1976); Copyright Statute
of Sept. 9, 1965 (Fed. Rep. Ger.), BGBI. I, No. 5 of Sept. 16, 1965, at 1273, reprinted
in COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Germany: Item 1, (1992)
[hereinafter German Copyright Statute].
24. See generally Rudolf Monta, The Concept of "Copyright" Versus the "Droit
d'Auteur," 32 S.CAL. L. REV. 177, 177-78 (1959). For example, most common law
countries do not recognize the "moral rights" of an author, while most civil law countries
do recognize such rights. See Leaffer, supra note 15, at 2 n.3.
25. Compare, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) with France's Literary and Artistic Property
Law of July 3, 1985, No. 85-660, J.O. July 4, 1985, 1985 D.S.L. 356 (amending Law
of March 11, 1957, No. 57-298), reprintedin COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE
WORLD, supra note 23, France: Item 1 [hereinafter Law of July 3, 1985].
26. The general philosophy of copyright is one of economic efficiency. The creation
and dissemination of the useful arts are promoted by providing an economic incentive for
authors to create. Yen, supra note 21, at 517. For example, the United States Supreme
Court stated that copyright exists solely to provide economic incentives for authors to
produce useful art. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 429, reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 1112 (1984) (quoting United States v. Paramount
Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)).
27. J.P. EDDY, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 5 (1956). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale
of Two Copyrights:Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TuL. L.
REV. 991 (1990) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Two Copyrights].
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cornerstone of Anglo-American copyright law-copyright is an incentive
for authors to create artistic and scientific works so that the public may
have access to, and benefit from, such works.28 In the United States,29
England, Australia, and most of the common law world, the limited rights
granted by copyright legislation" are a means by which this important
public interest may be achieved. The limited monopoly given to the
author is intended to motivate the creation of useful works of art and
science, and to ensure that they are made available to the public. Granting
authors the ability to control the reproduction and distribution of their
work ensures an economic return from which authors benefit and, thereby,
provides an incentive to create works.
Copyright protection in common law nations is viewed as necessary
because without it individuals desirous of an author's work would copy it

rather than pay for it. Authors would then find their returns insufficient,
and, therefore, the public would ultimately suffer because authors might
not create or distribute works of art and science.3" This perception is
based on the assumption that the production of such works is based
primarily on economic factors. 2
In the civil law world, the analog of copyright is a system of rights

called author's rights. 3 Author's rights embody two concepts-economic
and moral rights.

4

Although the civil law recognizes the economic and

moral nature of author's rights protection, both concepts are derived from
28. See Ginsburg, Two Copyrights, supra note 27, at 992.
29. In Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), the United States Supreme
Court announced that copyright was a statutory creation and not a common law property
right nor a natural right of the author. Id. at 661. Therefore, the Court subordinated the
author's protection to the interest of the public to access the works.
30. These rights include the right of reproduction, distribution, performance, display,
and preparing a derivative work. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C § 106 (1995); Copyright, Designs,
and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, § 16 (Eng.); Copyright Act 1968, pt. III, § 31, 1968
Austl. Acts 63.
31. Yen, supra note 21, at 518.
32. For a discussion of the empirical comparisons necessary to analyze this assumption
and copyright's incentive effects, see Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: 7he Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41
STAN.

L.

REV.

1343, 1349, 1413-21 (1989).

33. These systems of rights are called droit d'auteur (France), derecho de autor
(Spain), and Urheberrecht(Germany). Leaffer, supra note 15, at 1.
34. For example, in France, droitpatrimonialrecognizes the author's economic interest
and droitmoral recognizes nonpecuniary interests such as integrity or paternity. Russell
DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in
France and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1, 9-11 (1980).
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natural law. Author's rights recognize the right to claim authorship
throughout the existence of the work, to distribute the work as desired, to
derive monetary return from distribution of the work, and to protect the
work from injury or destruction. 35 The civil law tradition views the
author's work as an extension of the author's being, which the author
brought into existence through an act of creation.3 6 In contrast with the
common law, where copyright is derived by statute and is based on public
policy, author's rights are derived through the creation of the work and
are not necessarily subordinate to the overriding interests of the public."
This is a more sympathetic treatment of authors than under the common
law because authors are viewed as having a moral entitlement to control
the product of their creative effort.38
Even though the concept of author's rights encompasses both the
economic and moral nature of protection, neither aspect is viewed as
superior to the other.39 In deciding whether to enact legislation, civil law
legislatures consider both the economic and moral consequences of a
measure. This is a double theory of protection.40
It is the creation, intellectual manifestation of the personality, that
invests the author with the number of rights which proclaim explicitly
that the two prerogatives are born for the benefit of the author, one

35. See Anne Marie Cook, The Colorization of Black and White Films: An Example
of the Lack of Substantive Protectionfor Art in the United States, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 309, 311 n.9 (1988) (citing DaSilva, supra note 34, at 3-4 (1980)); Gerald L.
Rosen, Artists' Moral Rights: A European Evolution, An American Revolution, 2
CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAINMENT L.J. 155 (1983).
36. This justification for protection is derived from the writings of Hegel (personality
aspect of property) and Locke (labor theory of property). See JOHN LOCKE, THE
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 27-28 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Library of
Liberal Arts No. 31, 1952); G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT
§§ 44-46 (Allen W. Wood ed. & H. B. Nisbet trans., 1991).
37. See Karen M. Carr, Protection of Art Work 7hrough Artists' Rights: An Analysis
of State Law and Proposalfor Change, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 855 n.3 (1990); Monta, supra
note 24, at 178.
38. Leaffer, supra note 15, at 2.
39. See R.F. WHALE, COPYRIGHT: EVOLUTION, THEORY, PRACTICE 23-25 (1971).
40. See Monta, supra note 24, at 181. Note, however, that some civil law countries
view author's rights as a monist or unitary system. That is, while recognizing the
existence of the two elements, they are viewed as indistinguishable-two facets of a single
right. This view affects the rights of transfer and may differ from a dualist approach.
For a full discussion of this distinction, see Whale, supra note 39, at 23.
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of which is of a material kind, the pecuniary rights-and the other of
an immaterial kind, the moral right.4 1
This concept of protection is quite different from that of the common law
world.
An excellent manifestation of the conceptual difference between
common law and civil law copyright principles is in the area of moral
rights.42 Generally, moral rights4 3 include the rights of integrity,'

paternity,45 withdrawal, 6 and disclosure.47 These rights allow authors to
control certain aspects of their work even after the work has been sold or
otherwise disposed. The recognition of these rights is founded in the
natural law notion that a work of art belongs to its creator "in a way that
transcends the sale or transfer of the work to a new owner

. . .

because

personality." 48

Allowing an
the artist has imbued the work with her
author to retain some control over a protected work may cause conflict
between the interest of the public to access works of authorship and the
interest of the author in the work. As such, moral rights are an exception
to the economic rights granted to the author in common law countries
because they settle conflicts based on natural law principles, not
economics. In the common law world, moral rights are viewed by many
as antithetical to the notion of copyright as a means of achieving an
optimal level of societal welfare. 49

41. Monta, supra note 24, at 181.
42. The concept of moral rights is a derivative of natural law and originates in
eighteenth century France. Raymond Saurraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of
Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J.COMP. L. 465 (1968).
43. Depending on the civil law country, moral rights also include the right of access,
the resale royalty right (droitde suite), and the right of destruction. See generally Monta,
supra note 24, at 177-84.
44. The right of integrity is the right to see that the work is not mutilated or destroyed
even after it leaves the possession of the author. See Leaffer, supra note 15, at 255.
45. "The right of paternity [is] the right to assert authorship." Id.
46. "The right of withdrawal [is] the right to withdraw the work from publication or
to make modifications to it." Id.
47. The right of disclosure allows the author to control "when and in what form the
work may be presented to the public." Id.
48. Eric M. Brooks, "Tilted" Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights After U.S.
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1431, 1434 (1989).
49. See Craig A. Wagner, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive
Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 628, 690 (1989) (citing Monta, supra note 24, at 178.
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III. SOLUTIONS TO THE HOME TAPING PROBLEM

The home taping problem has been addressed by the legislatures of
many nations. As of March 1992, at least twenty countries had adopted
laws designed to balance the interests of copyright owners and the
consuming public: Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Congo,
Finland, France, Gabon, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Kenya, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Zaire.5"
Although the specific provisions of these laws vary greatly, the solutions
to the home taping problem can be generalized as follows. First, each of
the laws specifically exempts home taping of sound recordings from
copyright infringement actions.51 These exemptions protect the rights of
consumers to freely tape copyright protected sound recordings for their
own personal use.52 Second, the laws create a type of compulsory license
for the home taping of copyrighted sound recordings. 53
The various home taping royalties exist as a surcharge on blank audio
tape, recording devices, or both. Generally, the surcharge on audio tape
is either a flat fee per tape or a percentage fee based on the recording time
or quality of the tape. The surcharge on recording devices is a percentage
of the price for the device, and may be based on the number of
simultaneous recordings which can be made thereon. 54 Some of the
royalty schemes exempt professional recording devices from the
surcharge. 55 The royalties are charged to the manufacturers or distributors
of the audio tape and recording devices, who pass the cost along to
consumers.5 6 Once the home taping royalties are collected, they are
distributed to various copyright owners, including record companies,
musicians, composers, and performers.5 7

50. McKuin, supra note 4, at 331.
51. See J.A.L.

STERLING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SOUND RECORDINGS,

FILM & VIDEO: PROTECTION OF PHONOGRAPHIC AND CINEMATOGRAPHIC

RECORDINGS

AND WORKS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW § 20.28 (1992).
52. Consumer to consumer transfers of copied works are not included within this
protection. See id.; see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
53. See, e.g., Law of July 3, 1985, (France); German Copyright Statute.
54. See, e.g., Law of July 3, 1985, (France); German Copyright Statute. See also
Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 95-97.
55. Ginsburg, Reforms, supra tote 5, at 97.
56. Id. at 95-97.
57. See, e.g., Law of July 3, 1985 art. 38 [hereinafter French Law on Authors'
Rights].

246

N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 16

Regardless of particular legislative solutions to the home taping
problem adopted by these countries, there is an underlying concept of
natural law which justifies their use.58 The natural law justification for
home taping royalties is necessary because of the inadequacy of justifying
such schemes using economic efficiency alone.59 Legislative solutions to
the home taping problem burden society, especially individuals who do not
tape at home, but who use blank audio tape and recording devices in
legitimate, noninfringing ways. Further, all home taping royalty schemes
are extremely inefficient and have not been proven to increase societal
welfare. Requiring consumers to pay a fee to exercise rights incident to
the lawful ownership of copyrighted sound recordings is especially unfair
when the justification for doing so is illusory at best. Permitting a
legislative response to burden equally infringing and noninfringing
consumers cannot be justified using an economic efficiency argument
alone, and must be based at least in part on recognizing the natural rights
of the author.6" What follows is an examination of the typical solutions to
the home taping problem in civil law and common law countries, using
France and the United States as representative examples. 6
A. The Republic of France
In the Republic of France, legislation dealing with the private
reproduction of copyright protected works dates back to 1957.62
According to the Law of March 11, 1957 ("Act"), a copyright owner
could not prohibit the private copying or reproduction of disclosed works
that was strictly for the personal use of the copyist.63 However, at the
time the French Parliament did not contemplate technology that would

58. Yen, supra note 21, at 521.
59. See generally id.
60. Id., at 517.
61. This discussion uses France and the United States as representatives of civil and
common law countries. These legislative solutions are in no way the only methods used
by all nations within the civil or common law world. The examples are only provided to
show the conflicting interest of copyright owners and consumers under traditional
copyright principles of common law nations and author's rights within the civil law world.
For other examples of international home taping laws, see Sterling, supra note 51, § 20.
62. See Law of July 3, 1985 (amending Law of Mar. 11, 1957).
63. Id. Although the Act did not specifically mention the home taping of sound
recordings, its language was explicit-private copying would have been allowed as long
as the copyist retained possession of the copy. See Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at
93.
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enable large numbers of consumers to copy protected works with ease,
especially in relation to sound recordings. ' As reproductive technology
made it easier and less costly for consumers to copy protected works,
authors, scholars, and legislators called into question the validity of the
private copying exemption. 65
In 1976, the French Parliament addressed the perceived problem of
home taping when it considered a law that would have imposed a four
percent surcharge on audio tape recording devices. 66 This law was
ultimately rejected. 67 However, the interests of copyright owners and
users continued to be drawn into conflict because of advances in sound
reproduction technology. In 1985, the steady rise in home taping caused
Parliament to reconsider legislation to curb the taping of copyright
protected sound recordings. 68 The result was the reform of French
copyright law. 69
The 1985 copyright reform did not prohibit home taping. Rather, it
created a form of compulsory license for private taping of sound
recordings. 7" The compulsory license exists in the form of a surcharge on
blank audio tape. 7 The surcharge is based on the quality of the audio tape
and its recording length. 72 After the home taping revenue is collected, it

64. Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 93.
65. Id. at 84.
66. Id. at 94.
67. The proposed surcharge would have been used to fund a national center for music
and dance. Id. at 94-95.
68. Id. at 94.
69. See Law of July 3, 1985.
70. See Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 95.
71. All French manufacturers and importers of blank audio tape are required to pay
the surcharge and are expected to pass the added cost along to consumers, who are the
ones responsible for the home taping problem. Id. The initial surcharge was 1.5 francs
per sixty minutes of tape. See France to Levy Cassette Duty on Behalf of Creators,
REUTERs N. EUR. SERV., Sept. 18, 1986, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES
File. The home taping surcharge also applied to blank video tape as well. This aspect
of the law, however, will not be discussed in this article. For a more detailed discussion
of the home video taping problem, see Mills, supra note 9, at 309.
72. Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 96. A commission representing interested
parties was established to determine the amount of the surcharge. Half of the commission
members are representatives of authors, one-fourth represents consumers, and the
remaining one-fourth represents manufacturers and importers. Id. The revenue derived
from the tape surcharge is collected by a performing arts society similar to the American
Society of Composers, Authors and Producers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc.
("BMI") in the United States. See Law on Authors' Rights art. 38. Prior to receiving
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is distributed to the authors, performers, and producers of copyrighted
sound recordings73 based on the frequency with which each sound
recording is copied.74
Unfortunately, the copyright reform law does not specify the manner
in which the frequency of home taping is to be calculated. 75 The
legislative history of the law, however, refers to procedures used by the
French composers' rights society, the Socidtd des Auteurs, Compositeurs
et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM), to distribute royalties from
performance licenses granted to jukebox operators and other licensees. 76
The SACEM determines the frequency of public performances of licensed
works by identifying a representative sample of music licensees, and then
sends SACEM experts to note the compositions performed on the
licensees' premises.77 When the law was being debated, the French
Parliament estimated that the home taping surcharge would produce at
least 200 million Fr. per year. 78 Although current statistics are difficult
to obtain, the French surcharge on blank tape is viewed as a successful
solution to the home taping problem.79

B. The United States
The United States has experienced market conditions similar to those
in France, the United Kingdom, 80 and much of the world with respect to

and distributing any revenue, the organization would need to be authorized pursuant to
Title IV of the Law of July 3, 1985.
73. Authors receive one-half of the revenue while performers and producers each
receive one-fourth. See Law on Authors' Rights art. 36. Twenty-five percent of the total
revenue collected from the home taping royalty is used to assist in the creation and
communication of live theater and also to assist in the training of performing artists. Id.
art. 38.
74. Id. art. 33. See also Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 97.
75. Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 103.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 97.
79. See id. at 115-17.
80. The United Kingdom has experienced similar conditions and has also sought to
enact legislation protecting copyright owners against the unauthorized reproduction of their
works. See David Churchill, Plansfor Blank Tape Levy Under Review, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 4, 1985, § 1, at 8. In 1985, because of claims that home taping cost the
music and film industries millions of pounds per year, the government planned to
introduce a levy on blank video and audio tape, as well as to legitimize the home taping
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the home taping of copyright protected sound recordings and the sale of
prerecorded music.8" Since the early 1980s, the Senate and House of
Representatives discussed numerous bills which not only would have
permitted home taping, but also would have imposed a compulsory home
taping royalty on the purchase of blank audio tape and recording devices. 82
In contrast with France, however, the United States has only recently
enacted legislation which establishes a compulsory royalty for the home
taping of copyright protected sound recordings.83

of copyrighted material. Id. The levy was to be twenty-five pence per video cassette, and
ten pence per audio tape. Id.
81. See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text. For example, in Japan, government
advisors have endorsed a Cultural Affairs Agency plan to subject digital audio recording
devices and blank tape to a royalty. The royalty will be imposed only on digital audio
tape and equipment because, although analog tape and equipment should be included in
the royalty, "they are so widely used that it is impossible to collect royalties from the
equipment that is already in use . . . ." See Plan to Collect Royalties From Individuals
Receives Endorsement, Pat. Trademark & Copyright L. Daily (BNA) (Jan. 15, 1992).
In Australia, a home taping royalty exists on the first sale of blank audio tape.
Tapes less than 30 minutes in length, video tapes, or computer storage media are
exempted from the royalty. See Copyright Amendment Act 1989, ch. 2, § 135zzj
(Austl.). The amount of the royalty is determined by the Australian Copyright Tribunal
using the following formula: A x NM, where A is the amount per minute determined by
the Tribunal, and NM is the number of minutes of normal playing time of the tape. See
Copyright Amendment Act 1989, ch. 2, § 135zzn (Austl.). A collecting society
distributes the royalty under a claim procedure initiated by copyright owners and
manufacturers. See Copyright Amendment Act 1989, ch. 2, §§ 152-53 (Austl.). Exempt
bodies or prescribed organizations can recover the amount of royalty they paid upon
written proof to the collecting society. See Copyright Amendment Act 1989, ch. 2, §
135zzs (Austi.).
82. See infra notes 89-97 and accompanying text.
83. 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1992). However, the United States Congress has at numerous
times debated a home taping law, but a bill has yet to pass both the House of
Representatives and the Senate. See, e.g., Arguments Before the Court, 52 U.S.L.W.
3227 (U.S. Oct. 11, 1983); Regulatory and Legal Developments, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) No. 79, at A-29 (Apr. 23, 1982).
There is an ongoing debate as to whether there is a home taping exemption under
current United States copyright law. Those in favor of the exemption argue that the
legislative history of the Sound Recording Amendments of 1971 recognizes the home
taping rights of consumers. See Sound Recording Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85
Stat. 391 (1971). Scholars have also argued that there is a universal feeling that home
taping is not a copyright infringement as there have been no court challenges to home
taping as an infringement. 3 MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (F)(5)
(1990). Opponents of the home taping exemption argue that there is no exemption, and
that the only possible defense for home taping is the fair use doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. §
107 (1988). See also Weimer, supra note 1, at 482-83.
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The home taping issue was first addressed by Congress in 1971, albeit
indirectly. When Congress enacted the Sound Recording Amendments of
1971 ("1971 Amendments"), which extended copyright protection to
sound recordings, it made clear that the 1971 Amendments were aimed at
Although the text of the 1971
record piracy, not home taping.
Amendments did not mention home taping, the House Report stated, "it
is not the intention of the Committee to restrain home recording ...
where [it is done] for the private use and with no purpose of reproducing
or otherwise capitalizing commercially on it." 84 In other words, Congress
believed home taping was not an infringing activity.
A few years later Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 (" 1976
Act"), which codified the fair use exception to copyright infringement
actions85 and brought the home taping issue into question once again. As
with the 1971 Amendments, neither the 1976 Act nor its legislative history
directly mentioned the home taping issue.8 6 Rather, the House Report of
the 1976 Act merely stated that the 1976 Act was "not intended to give
[home] taping any special status . . .beyond the normal and reasonable

limits of (thel fair use" exception to copyright infringement.87 This
language has been viewed by some scholars as a significant indication that
Congress viewed home taping as copyright infringement.88
The first series of legislative attempts to address the home taping
problem directly began with the proposed Home Recording Act of 1982
("1982 Act"). 8 9 The 1982 Act would have created an exemption for the
private copying of sound recordings for personal use and would have
instituted a reasonable royalty fee on all blank tape and recording

84. H.R. Rep. No. 487, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1951), reprinted in 1951
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572.
85. Melville Nimmer, Copyright Liabilityfor Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the
Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1514 (1982).
86. Michael Plumleigh, Comment, Digital Audio Tape: New Fuel Stokes the
Smoldering Home Taping Fire, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 733, 737 n.16 (1990).
87. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5669, 5679.
88. Nimmer, supra note 85, at 1514-17.
89. See S. 1758, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 119 (1982); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982). Since then, Congress has considered various forms of legislation aimed at
balancing the conflicting interests of copyright owners and consumers. In 1990, the
United States Congress considered a bill to implement a serial copy management system
(SCMS) for digital audio tape. This system would have allowed copying of digital
recordings onto the digital media, but would have prevented subsequent copying from the
copy. See H.R. 4046, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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The fee would have been

charged to importers and

manufacturers and would have been determined by the United States
Copyright Royalty Tribunal ("Royalty Tribunal"). 9 Evidence of the
economic efficiency motivation for the bill is found in Stanley M.
Gortikov's statement that the bill "will establish a royalty system that will
create a fair incentive for the recording of music." 92 In part because of
intense criticism of the bill by both sides of the home taping debate, 93 the
bill died in committee.
it
In 1983, Congress again took up the home taping issue when 94
considered the proposed Home Recording Act of 1983 ("1983 Act").
The 1983 Act was nearly identical to the 1982 Act except for the absence
of the Royalty Tribunal in determining the royalty fee. Under the 1983
Act, the royalty fee would have been determined independently by
9
copyright owners and organizations representing such copyright owners. "

In the event a voluntary agreement could not be reached, the parties would
be subject to compulsory arbitration under the auspices of the Royalty
Tribunal.96 History repeated itself when the 1983 Act died in committee.
In 1986, Congress again failed to enact legislation which was similar to
the two prior bills except that a fixed royalty rate was to be used.9 7 The

90. S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 119 (1982); H.R. 5705, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982).
91. See S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 119 (1982).
92. Gortikov was the president of the Recording Industry Association of America, and
one of the leading lobbyists for the bill. See CongressionalPanels HearConflicting Views
on Merits of Home Video Recording Legislation, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No.
79, at A-29 (Apr. 23, 1982) (emphasis added).
93. See id.
94. S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 119 (1983); H.R. 1030, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
95. Voluntary agreements would be legally binding provided that
[t]he agreements are accepted unanimously by the panel of copyright owners
in accordance with paragraph 3 of this clause and copies of the agreements are
filed in the copyright office within thirty days of execution in accordance with
regulations that the register shall prescribe.
S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 119 (1983); H.R. 1030, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
96. S. 31, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 119 (1983); H.R. 1030, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983).
97. See S. 1739, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1986). The fixed royalty rate was as
follows: (1) five percent of the price for the first domestic sale of each audio recording
device; (2) twenty-five percent of the domestic sale price for dual recording devices; and
(3) one cent per minute of the maximum playing time for blank audio tape. Microphoneonly record and playback-only machines were to be exempt from the royalty. See id.
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1986 legislation also failed amid criticism and concern over the royalty
administration and distribution methods.
The next wave of legislation began after the advent, but before the
marketing, of digital recording devices. Because of the superior quality
of digital recordings, copyright owners became increasingly concerned
with the effect digital recording technology would have on the already
serious home taping problem. As a result, copyright owners extensively
lobbied Congress to restrict the sale and use of digital audio tape in the
United States. In 1987, the Senate and House of Representatives discussed
numerous bills aimed at requiring special copy-chip protection for digital
recording devices.9" Copy-chip protection would enable home taping of
sound recordings by digital recording devices, but would encode the tape
with an inaudible signal that would prevent future copying from that
copy. 99 After this attempt failed, Congress considered the Digital Audio
Tape Recorder Act of 1990 ("1990 Act"),"00 which required the same type
of copy prevention mechanism on home digital recording devices.
Renamed the Serial Copy Management System ("SCMS") under the 1990
Act, all digital recording devices sold in the United States would have
been equipped with this preventative technology.101
Although the SCMS was applauded by the recording industry as
adequate protection for copyrighted sound recordings, composers argued
that their rights in the underlying musical compositions' °2 were not being
protected and complained that the bill lacked a royalty system."0 3 Under
such criticism, the 1990 Act stalled in committee.
Nevertheless, Congress again sought to protect sound recordings from
home taping with the Audio Home Recording Act of 1991 (" 1991 Act").'04

98. See S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1-3 (1987); H.R. 13S4, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987). See also S. 539 & S. 635, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., § 101, § 3001 (1987);
H.R. 1155 & H.R. 1603, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
99. See S. 506, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1-3 (1987).
100. See S. 2358, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990); H.R. 4096, 101 Cong., 2d Sess.
(1990). Analog recording devices and blank tape would have been unaffected. See S.
2358.
101. See See S. 2358, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990).
102. In the United States, sound recordings have dual copyright elements, both in the
sound recording and in the underlying musical composition. See 17 U.S.C. § 106-114
(1992).
03. See Intellectual Property, Protection Sought for New Technological Products,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 13, at S-49 (Jan. 18, 1991).
104. See S. 1623, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3204, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
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Unlike its predecessor, the 1991 Act included both the SCMS requirement
and a home taping royalty.'0 5 Under a comprehensive distribution plan,
the royalty was to be distributed to "interested copyright parties," 106 which
included composers, publishers, and musicians.10 7 Although the 1991 Act
was viewed as a positive solution to the home taping problem and was
supported by parties on both sides of the home taping debate, it also died
in committee. 10 8
The persistence of the United States home taping lobby paid off on
October 28, 1992, when President George Bush signed the Audio Home
Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA") into law.10 9 The AHRA is basically a
codification of an agreement reached between the recording and music
industries and the audio equipment manufacturing and distribution
industries. This agreement paved the way for the widespread marketing
of digital recording devices and blank tape."' In short, the AHRA
consists of three components: (1) a SCMS requirement for all home digital
audio recording devices manufactured, imported, or sold in the United
States; (2) a home taping royalty scheme for digital recording devices and
media; and, (3) a prohibition on copyright infringement actions based on
" '
digital or analog home taping. 11
The first prong of the AHRA prohibits the importation, manufacture,
or sale of any digital audio recording device not equipped with an SCMS
or its equivalent."' The AHRA requires the Secretary of Commerce to
establish a procedure to verify, upon the petition of each "interested
105. See S. 1623.
106. Interested copyright parties were defined as the owners of exclusive rights under
§ 106(1) of the Copyright Act of 1976-to reproduce a sound recording of a musical work
that has been lawfully made and distributed to the public. See S. 1623, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 1001(6)(a) (1991).
107. See S. 1623, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., § 1014(a)&(b) (1991). The collected royalty
would have been allocated to two funds, the Sound Recording Fund, and the Musical
Works Fund. Each fund would have served a separate portion of the interested parties,
who would have needed to make claims to receive compensation. See S. 1623, 102d
Cong., Ist Sess. § 1014-16 (1991).
108. See Compromise Bill on Home Taping, supra note 2, at 613.
109. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1992)).
110. Remarks of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights to the ABA Conference, 38 Pat.
Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) No. 945, at 468 (Aug. 31, 1989); New Bill Would
Require DAT Recorders to Inhibit Second-Generation Copying, 39 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) No. 970, at 345 (Mar. 1, 1990).
111. 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1995).
112. § 1002(a).
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party," that a system meets the standards of the SCMS." 3 Accordingly,
each manufacturer or importer of digital audio recording devices must
petition the Secretary of Commerce before it can lawfully sell such devices
in the United States.1 14 The AHRA also prohibits the importation,
manufacture, or sale of any device capable of circumventing the SCMS of
any digital audio recording device." 5 In addition, each manufacturer or
importer must file an appropriate notice, provide quarterly and annual
statements of account, and deposit the requisite royalty payments with the
Register of Copyrights before it can import or sell digital audio recording
devices in the United States.""
17
The second prong of the AHRA establishes the home taping royalty.
The royalty on blank digital audio tape is two percent of the "transfer
price"8-the actual entered value at United States Customs or FOB the

manufacturer exclusive of direct sales and excise taxes." 9 In the case of
recording devices, the royalty is two percent of the transfer price, subject
to a statutory minimum and maximum of $1 and $8 per device,
respectively.' 2" If the unit is physically integrated and contains more than
one digital audio recording device, the maximum royalty is $12.2
Beginning on October 28, 1998, the royalty rates for recording devices
may be adjusted annually upon the petition of an interested party to the
Librarian of Congress, "if more than [twenty] percent of the royalty
payments are at the relevant royalty maximum .
113. § 1002(b).
114. Violation of § 1002 or § 1003 subject the violator to significant penalties. Civil
actions based on violations of these sections may be brought in the United States district
courts by an interested copyright party or "any person injured by [such] violation." §
1009(a) & (b). The district courts are authorized to grant temporary or permanent
injunctions, award actual and statutory damages, and impound and destroy infringing
articles. In the case of a violation of § 1003 (royalty section), actual damages include the
amount of the royalty plus an additional amount equal to fifty percent of the actual
damages. § 1009(d)(1)(A)(ii).
115. § 1002(c).
116. § 1003.
117. § 1004.
118. § 1004(a)(1).
119. § 1001(12)(A). If the transferor and transferee are related or within a single
entity, the transfer price shall not be less than "a reasonable arms-length price under the
principles of the regulations adopted pursuant to § 482 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 . . . ." § 1001(12)(B).

120. § 1004(a)(1)(3).
121. § 1004(a)(3).
122. However, the increase in the royalty shall not exceed the percentage increase in
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The home taping royalties are collected by the Register of Copyrights
and deposited in the Treasury of the United States.' 23 The royalties are
divided into two funds-the Sound Recordings Fund and the Musical
Works Fund."2 4 Sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the total royalty is
allocated to the Sound Recordings Fund, and the remaining thirty-three
and one-third percent is allocated to the Musical Works Fund. 121 The
royalties deposited in the Sound Recordings Fund are made available to
various interested parties in the following percentages: nonfeatured
musicians (2.625%); nonfeatured vocalists (1.375%); featured recording
artists (38.4%); and copyright owners, usually record companies
(57.6 %).126 The royalties deposited in the Musical Works Fund1 27are made
available to music publishers and writers in equal percentages.
After the home taping royalties are collected, they are distributed by
the Librarian of Congress based on claims filed by the relevant interested
copyright parties.1 21 The interested copyright parties within a particular
group may agree among themselves as to the appropriate distribution of
the royalty payments: lump their claims together and file them jointly or
as a single claim; or appoint an agent to file for them.2 9 If there are
disputes as to the distribution of the royalty payments, the Librarian of
panel to
Congress is obligated to convene a copyright arbitration royalty
1 30
determine the appropriate distribution of the royalty payments.
The final prong of the AHRA prohibits copyright infringement actions
based on the manufacture and noncommercial use of both digital and
analog home recording devices and media. 3 1 Accordingly, the private
home taping of protected sound recordings infringes neither the copyrights
in the sound recordings nor the underlying musical compositions
themselves. This prohibition ends the two decade debate over the legality
of the home taping of sound recordings-home taping is now legal under
federal law. However, record piracy is still illegal.
the Consumer Price Index during the period under review. § 1004(a)( 3 ).
123. "All funds held by the Secretary of the Treasury [are] invested in interest-bearing
United States securities for later distribution with interest under § 1007." § 1005.
124. § 1005.
125. § 1006(b).
126. § 1006(b)(1).
127. § 1006(b)(2).

128. § 1007.
129.

§ 1007(a)(2).

130. § 1007(c).
131.

§ 1008.
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IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE HOME TAPING ROYALTY
Royalty and compulsory licensing schemes, as well as other legislative
attempts to balance the competing interests of copyright owners and the
consuming public, are viewed by many as excellent solutions to the home
Former United States Register of Copyrights Barbara
taping problem.'
Ringer has stated that a royalty or -ompulsory licenxsing scheme is a
possible solution to the home taping problem when technological advances
make it impossible to reconcile the interests of copyright owners and
In fact, Ringer claims that a compulsory licensing scheme may
users.'
be the only solution to the home taping problem when technological
advances make it impossible to provide exclusive rights under copyright
law. 3 Professor Melville Nimmer has advocated the use of a home
taping royalty system as a remedy in cases of copyright infringement by
the home taping of sound recordings. 3 5 Other scholars and commentators
have argued that compulsory licensing schemes and other legislative

actions are necessary given the exacerbation of the problems of copyright
enforcement because of developing technology."" In general, legislative
solutions to curb home taping are viewed as positive solutions to the home
taping problem.
In contrast, however, some argue that a legislature is unable to
provide an efficient solution to the home taping problem.' 37 Using the

common law copyright principles, these legislative solutions must be

132. See generally Mills, supra note 9 (although Mills advocates using a market
solution to solve the problem of home taping, she points out that legislative solutions are
viewed as appropriate solutions to the unrestricted home taping of sound and audiovisual
recordings).
133. See Ringer, supra note 3, at 306-07.
134. Id.
135. See Melville Nimmer, CopyrightLiabilityfor Audio Home Recording: Dispelling
the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1530 (1982). Nimmer contemplated a judicial
solution to home taping wherein copyright owners would license defendant manufacturers
of recording equipment to continue producing the equipment in exchange for a percentage
of the manufacturers' revenue. Nimmer also envisioned that the manufacturers would pass
the cost of the royalty along to the consumer. This is justified because "the consumer is
the primary infringer, [and] there is no reason why he should not ultimately pay for the
privilege of recording copyrighted works." Id. at 1531-33.
136. See Mills, supra note 9, at 310-11. See also Yale M. Braunstein et al.,
Economics of Property Righits as Applied to Computer Sofiware and Data Bases, in
TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT: SOURCES AND MATERIALS 235, 245 (George P. Bush &
Robert H. Dreyfuss eds., rev. ed. 1979).
137. See Mills, supra note 9, at 318.
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guided by economic efficiency. However, one scholar has pointed out that
economic analysis is problematic when used to determine copyright
protection.' 38 The current legislative solutions have fundamental flaws and
do not completely reconcile the competing interests of copyright owners
and consumers. In fact, it has been argued that reconciling the competing
interests of copyright owners and consumers can be more efficiently
addressed in the market place.' 39 Accordingly, the common law copyright
principle of economic efficiency fails to be an adequate justification for a
home taping royalty because more efficient and less restrictive alternatives
are available.
A. Shortcomings of Economic Analysis of Copyright
The use of economic analysis in copyright law is problematic because
of the problems inherent in defining and measuring societal welfare.140
Although these flaws are reason enough for not grounding copyright law
on economic analysis alone,' 41 historically, copyright protection in the
common law has been determined solely using this analysis. Generally,
there are two methods used to analyze social welfare in economic terms:
' and wealth maximization. 41 3 Under Paretianism, if at least
Paretianism 42
one person is better off with the copyright protection, and no one is worse
off, and no other superior situation exists, the protection is socially
beneficial.'" Under wealth maximization, the copyright regime that
maximizes society's total wealth, regardless of distribution, is most
appropriate. Wealth maximization holds that the optimal level of
protection is that which maximizes the difference between the economic
gains derived and the loss resulting from copyright protection. '45
138. See Yen, supra note 21, at 539-46.
139. See generally Mills, supra note 9.
140. See Yen, supra note 21, at 539.
141. See id.; Gordon, supra note 32, at 1435-68.
142. For a complete discussion of the principle of Paretianism, see Yen, supra note
21, at 539-41. See also JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 97-98
(1988).
143. For a complete discussion of wealth maximization, see Yen, supra note 21, at
541-46; Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 191-92 (1980);
Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle,9 J. LEGAL STUD.
227, 228-29 (1990); Richatd A. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin
and Kronman, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Value of Wealth].
144. See Yen, supra note 21, at 539-40.
145. See id. at 541; see generally Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and
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Paretianism and wealth maximization as measures of societal welfare,
however, are flawed. Thus, even if they produce satisfactory results, they
are inadequate as the sole grounds for
justifying copyright protection and,
14 6
in particular, home taping royalties.
Although the normative use of economics is problematic when
analyzing social welfare, its use is not surprising. Copyright scholar
Wendy Gordon has stated: "That economics should be a focus of attention
is [not] surprising, since both copyright and patent law are seen as serving
primarily economic incentive functions."' 47 However, Gordon also points
out that "'wealth maximization' as an aggregative criterion that disregards
the possibility of independently derived individual rights, cannot serve as
an acceptable foundation for the initial assignment of entitlements.'1 48 In
fact, critics have expressed concern that copyright's incentive effects might
be too weak to justify certain types of protection. 49 In all "a fairly wide
range of [efficiency theory] commentary centers on the possibility that the
institution of intellectual property is not carrying its economic weight." 150
Therefore, "there is little justification for placing all of our faith in
economic analysis as a workable method for shaping copyright in any
meaningful [way].""'
1. Paretianism
Under Paretianism, copyright protection is based on a comparison of
the existing and proposed methods of protection. If one person is better
off under the proposed method than under the existing method, and no one
is worse off, the proposed method of protection is said to be "pareto
superior" to the existing method of protection. 5 2 The pareto superior
position is said to be "pareto optimal" if there is no other pareto superior
position. 153

At first glance, Paretianism appears to be an acceptable way of
determining copyright protection. However, closer analysis reveals that
Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 119 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Utilitatianism].
146. Yen, supra note 21, at 539.
147. See Gordon, supra note 32, at 1348.
148. See id. at 1351.
149. See id. at 1349.
150. See id. at n.25.
151. Yen, supra note 21, at 543.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 540.
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quantifying social welfare using the theory of Paretianism is problematic.
Paretianism fails to compare all possible pareto optimal protection schemes
simultaneously. Because Paretianism is incapable of determining whether
one pareto superior situation is better than another pareto superior
situation, 1" the pareto principle does not lead to one pareto optimal
solution. This inability to lead to a single proposed protection scheme
demonstrates that Paretianism alone is incapable of prescribing the most
beneficial level of copyright protection. Therefore, a principle other than
and select from
Paretianism is "required to justify an initial
1 5 arrangement
the remaining Pareto optimal solutions. )
2. Wealth Maximization
Wealth Maximization "uses the concept of wealth as [its] scale," 5 '
which is analogous to the common law principle of economic efficiency.
New works of authorship, which are allegedly created because of the
incentive effects of providing protection, increase society's wealth. The
appropriate level of protection is determined by comparing the increase in
society's wealth with the losses imposed by protection. If there is a net
increase in society's wealth, the proposed change is beneficial. In other
words, situation A is superior to situation B if in A: 1) at least one person
is better off than in B; and 2) those people better off in A are capable of
retaining some of their gains while compensating those who have become
worse off. 157 Wealth Maximization appears to be a relatively easy way to
determine the appropriate level of copyright protection by suggesting a
single result on how far to extend copyright protection.
Despite its appearances, Wealth Maximization is flawed as the sole
measure of societal welfare. It is problematic because the determination
of w-ealth requires information which often is not available. 58 A proper

154. See id. at 539.
155. Id. at 541.
156. Id. Judge Posner defined wealth as the following:
[T]he value in dollars or dollar equivalents ... of everything in society. It is
measured by what people are willing to pay for something or, if they already
own it, what they demand in money to give it up. The only kind of preference
that counts in a system of wealth maximization is thus one that is backed up by
money-in other words, that is registered in a market.
Posner, Utilitarianism,supra note 145, at 119.

157. See COLEMAN, supra note 142, at 100.
158. The information typically not available for a complete analysis under Wealth
Maximization is calculation of the frequency of copying, the costs and benefits of a home
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determination requires a ranking of all potential uses of a work or
consequences of a level of protection in the order of their relative costs
and benefits. Involved in this ranking is a determination of how the
particular change in protection will motivate authors to create, and how
potential infringing consumers will behave.159 This information simply is
Hard empirical information necessary to
impossible to obtain. 60
accurately determine the effect of copyright protection on the actions of
authors and consumers is unavailable.
Wealth Maximization is further flawed because its reliance on price
as a determinative factor creates the risk of indeterminacy-copyright
protection is expanded and contracted as the relative price of products
change.' 6' Finally, Wealth Maximization analysis lends itself to justifying
whatever copyright protection is proposed.' 62 Reliance on this method of
economic analysis is suspect, and it should not be the sole determinative
factor in deciding whether to expand copyright protection.
Aside from its economic limitations, Wealth Maximization also rests
on questionable ethical grounds. Although wealth has a place in society,
it is not the only thing that is valued highly.163 In some Situat ,o1ns, socletal
wealth may not be increased by a particular protection scheme, but the
scheme is desirable nevertheless, e.g., it is the right thing to do. Great
debate has occurred on whether wealth is a component of social value."M
Whatever the outcome, wealth must certainly not be the only factor to be
considered in ordering society. Factors such as equity, privacy, and
proper structure of
freedom must be considered in determining the
65
1
otherwise.
or
copyright
whether
laws,
society's

taping royalty, and the effect of a home taping royalty on the incentive to create and
distribute sound recordings. See Yen, supra note 21, at 542.
159. See id. at 543.
160. Professor Yen notes that:
Brief reflection reveals the practical impossibility of undertaking such an endeavor.
No judge (or legislature, for that matter) could ever identify all of the possible uses
of a work. Moreover, the empirical information necessary to calculate the effects
of copyright law on the actions of authors, potential defendants, and consumers is
simply unavailable, and is probably uncollectible.
Id. at 542-43 & n.162.
161. See id. at 544-46.
162. See Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 648-49
(1980).
163. See generally Dworkin, supra note 143, at 191-226.
164. See id. at 224-26; Posner, Value of Wealth, supra note 143, at 243-52.
165. See Yen, supra note 21, at 542. On this point, Professor Yen writes the
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B. Shortcomings of Compulsory Licensing Schemes
The shortcomings of the current home taping royalty schemes are
manifold. Primarily, no legislative solution can efficiently address
changes in technology that present new challenges to the interests of
copyright owners and users.166 Second, the solutions unfairly disadvantage
purchasers of blank audio tape and audio recording devices who do not
participate in home taping of copyrighted sound recordings. Third, and
perhaps most important, the current solutions have fundamental flaws in
their use when traditional copyright principles are examined: specifically
with reference to providing an economic incentive for authors to create
artistic works. These shortcomings add to the problems inherent in
economic analysis and support the conclusion that the traditional copyright
principles of common law nations are insufficient as the sole justification
for a home taping royalty.
A legislative solution to any problem will suffer the shortcoming of
only being able to address conflicting interests under then existing
technology. Rapid changes in technology bring interests into conflict in
ways the legislature did not expect when enacting the legislation.
Although legislators attempt to make laws that will adapt to societal and
technological change, it is often impossible to foresee how interests will
be brought into conflict in the future. 1 67 For example, the 1985 French
home taping royalty scheme did not address the potential economic effects
of digital audio tape on the sound recording market. Even then, digital
audio recording devices presented the possibility of producing copies that

following:
[If wealth maximization truly identifies the optimal order of society, it must
do so because a society which maximizes wealth necessarily observes all other
values worth recognizing. In my view, such an assumption is patently
unrealistic. Since wealth maximization responds only to those values which are
backed up by money . . . there is simply no reason to believe that a society
which values wealth will also properly respect values which are riot bought or
sold ....
Id.
166. Although the United States has dealt with the new digital audio recording
technology, it took Congress nine years of considering home taping to decide the issue.
See supra notes 89-109 and accompanying text.
167. Note, however, that S. 1623 and H.R. 3204 would have required a surcharge on
blank audio tape, and recording devices that are now known or hereafterdeveloped trying
to solve the problem of rapid technological change. See S. 1623, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991); H.R. 3204, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See also Compromise Bill on Home
Taping, supra note 2, at 614, col. 2.
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are equal in sound quality to the original recording. Similarly, the United
States' AHRA does not address the potential effects of recordable CD
technology, which is just now becoming available to consumers. To
respond to this new technology, Congress will have to redraft the AHRA
to take into account the new recording devices as well as the recordable
CDs. 168
Another instance of the inefficiency of legislative solutions to the

home taping problem is found in the administrative costs of compulsory
licensing systems. 1 69

As with any legislative solution, compulsory

licensing systems have administrative costs associated with their use which
make the collection and distribution of a licensing fee inefficient.
Whenever a legislature attempts to solve a problem through mandatory
licensing, an agency must be established, or an existing agency utilized,
to oversee the licensing system. 7 ° To function, these agencies require
significant budgets. The funding for these agencies most often is drawn
from the licensing fees collected, which are supposed to be earmarked for
distribution to copyright owners. 7 Because of the nonprofit nature of
state agencies, or even state-sanctioned private agencies, their operations
tend not to be as efficient as a pure market participant. Tolerating this
inefficiency cannot be adequately justified using economic efficiency as a
maxim, especially when more efficient means exist. 7 '
Further problems with home taping royalty schemes exist in their
distribution systems. Any home taping royalty that is aimed at reconciling
the competing interests of copyright owners and users necessarily entails
some type of distribution system.173 Such a system may be based on a

168. At the very least, the surcharge will have to be re-evaluated to take into account
this new form of recording technology. These re-evaluations take considerable time, as
evidenced by the United States Copyright Royalty Tribunal taking over a year to adjust
the compulsory licensing royalties for sound recordings in jukeboxes. See Recording
Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
169. Although these costs may be passed on to users, as infringers, legislatively
imposed licensing schemes are an inefficient solution as compared with, for example, a
market solution. See Mills, supra note 9, at 320-21.
170. Example of these agencies include, for instance, the United States Copyright
Royalty Tribunal, or the French Soci&6t des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs de
Musique (SACEM). Whether private or public, these agencies have budgets that draw
their funding from the collected licensing fees.
171. For example, the 1992 AHRA allows both the Register of Copyrights and the
Librarian of Congress to deduct "reasonable administrative costs" from the collected
royalties before distribution. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 1005, 1007(b) (1993).
172. See Mills, supra note 9, at 330-38.
173. Note that the French Parliament originally attempted to use the compulsory
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claim procedure 74 or frequency calculation-the frequency with which
each sound recording is copied. 175 Claim procedures and frequency
calculations are problematic because they are highly speculative and
inequitable at best.1 76 For example, the AHRA's claim procedure is in no
way related to the amount of home taping that affects particular artists and
music producers. 7 7 Aside from the fact that there is no way to adequately
determine the amount of home taping that occurs with respect to a
particular artist's or producer's works, the amounts allocated within the
two Funds disproportionately favor large record companies and do not
known and new artists and
provide a sufficient incentive for lesser
178
works.
musical
produce
to
producers
The 1985 French compulsory licensing system's frequency
calculation, which is based on the number of times songs are played on
jukeboxes within France, is similarly flawed.' 7 9 This calculation
presupposes that the majority of the sound recordings being copied are the
ones being played on jukeboxes or appear on record charts. The validity
of this assumption is questionable. Granted, some of the jukebox
selections are representative of the sound recordings being copied by the
home tapers. However, at least some of the sound recordings that are
being copied are of older recordings, which do not appear on jukeboxes;
or of more contemporary records that are not popular enough to be
included in jukebox selections. 80 Simply put, the causal relationship
between frequency calculations and the amount of actual home taping is
impossible to prove.
The problems with frequency calculations and claim procedures
become more apparent when the purpose of copyright protection in the

licensing fee to fund a national center for music. See Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 94-95.
This attempt was opposed by the SACEM, which wanted the licensing fee to be distributed
to authors, musicians, and producers. Id. at 95.
174. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1007(a) (1993).
175. See generally Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 96-97.
176. See McKuin, supra note 4, at 336.
177. See id. at 337-38.
178. See McKuin, supra note 4, 338-39.
179. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
180. Authors who do not rank very highly on record charts, or do not have many
recordings in jukeboxes, may not receive enough of a percentage of the distributed home
taping royalty to encourage them to produce. Although the Audio Home Recording Act
of 1992 attempts to solve this problem through instituting a claim procedure, see 17
U.S.C.A. § 1007(a), its ability to protect and compensate newer and lesser known
authors, musicians, and producers is unproven.
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common law world is examined. The purpose behind copyright law, and
therefore compulsory licensing systems, is to promote the production of
the useful arts by providing a set of rights that allows authors to receive
compensation for their efforts-economic efficiency. How are the goals of
copyright served by providing the most popular musicians, performers,
and producers, who already receive a great deal of compensation from
high volume sales, additional compensation through a home taping
royalty? 8 ' These artists and producers need little incentive to produce
sound recordings other than the lucrative recording contracts they already
have and are able to sign. Less famous artists and producers will not
share in royalty systems to the extent of more famous individuals, and will
not be encouraged to produce such works. In this regard, home taping
royalties may act as a disincentive for lesser known artists because such
artists will not view themselves as benefiting from the royalties.
Another area where home taping royalty schemes are problematic is
the control over the copyrighted sound recordings. Copyright owners lose
control over their works when centralized agencies set the royalty fees and
control the distribution of the collected royalties. 182 Barbara Ringer
expressed concern over the prospect of the United States Copyright Office
taking too much of a regulatory role in compulsory licensing schemes. 1 3
Ringer stated that she was troubled about government involvement in
authorship, because compulsory licensing invites state oversight of the
creative efforts of authors and threatens a loss of individuality of authors
and artistic works."8 This loss of control is of critical importance to
copyright owners and makes a legislatively imposed compulsory licensing
system appropriate only in extreme situations."' 5 Some copyright owners
and scholars argue that the home taping problem is an extreme situation.

181. These popular musicians, like Madonna, Michael Jackson, and Bruce Springsteen,
will be the individuals who benefit disproportionately from a compulsory licensing system
aimed at home taping because they are the artists who appear at the tops of the record
charts, or on jukebox selections. These artist will continue to produce music without a
compulsory licensing system because they are already being sufficiently compensated
through lucrative recording contracts.
182. See BRAUNSTEIN, supra note 136, at 243.
183. Mills, supra note 9, at 320.
184. See Ringer, supra note 3, at 303.
185. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, S2 CoLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1613
(1982). Gordon states that "[in extreme instances, Congress may correct for market
distortions by imposing a regulatory solution such as a compulsory licensing scheme ....
But the broad brush of this regulatory solution is too sweeping for most cases." Id.
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However, compulsory licensing has been criticized as going too far toward
governmental intrusion into the useful arts and into an area where
8 6 the
problems.'
own
its
out
working
in
successful
be
can
place
market
Additional problems with the legislative solutions to the home taping
problem exist because of the disadvantages to noninfringing users of blank
audio tape and recording devices. A surcharge on all blank audio tape or
recording devices presupposes that all tapes and devices are used in
infringing ways. Actually, numerous individuals use blank tape and
recording devices for legitimate, noninfringing purposes. Among the
members of the noninfringing class are individuals who would be
beneficiaries of a home taping royalty: musicians, composers, and
producers, both professional and amateur.1" 7 Other members of the
noninfringing class include the computer industry, computer users, the
blind, and individuals who use recording devices only for noninfringing
purposes, e.g., for recording letters.
Musicians and composers account for a large percentage of the blank
audio tape consuming public.188 These professionals use blank audio tape
and recording devices to record songs, lyrics, live performances, and
music that they hope to publish, use as "demos," or use again in the
future."8 9 Requiring these individuals to pay a home taping royalty when

186. See Home Recording of Copyrighted Works, 1982: Hearings on H.R. 4783, 4794,
4808, 5250, 5488, and 5705, Before the House Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Admin. ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 160,
285 (1982) (statement of George Atkinson, President, The Video Station, Inc.).
187. Although the 1992 AHRA excludes from the royalty scheme "professional model
products," 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3)(A), this exclusion is problematic at best. First, the
definition of "professional model products" is vague-"an audio recording device that is
designed, manufactured, marketed, and intendedfor use by recordingprofessionals in the
ordinary course of a lawfid business, in accordance with such requirements as the
Secretary of Commerce shall establish by regulation." 17 U.S.C. § 1001(10) (emphasis
Further, there are thousands of struggling musicians and "recording
added).
professionals" who use normal digital audio recording devices exclusively in noninfringing
ways. These individuals often cannot afford the rather expensive professional models, and
instead purchase nonprofessional home recording devices for use in their professional
endeavors. Requiring these individuals to pay a royalty for use of such devices is patently
unfair.
188. Even though the actual number of musicians and composers as a percentage of
blank tape purchasers is unavailable, it is reasonable to assume that the number is not
insignificant. The actual percentage of bank tape purchased by this group may even be
larger than their percentage of the number of "home tapers" given the large numbers of
tapes used by each of these individuals.
189. These tapes are often high quality CrO or metal tapes, whose royalties may be
higher per tape. Amateur musicians and composers also purchase large numbers of blank
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they do not violate the copyrights of others is patently unfair. Further,
musicians purchase expensive recording and duplicating equipment to use
in these efforts. A home taping royalty proportional to the quality of the
recording device is another disadvantage to these individuals.190 Although
some compulsory licensing schemes exempt certain groups from the
surcharge, 9 ' it is impractical to create a scheme whereby the interests of
this group are adequately protected. Logistically, it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to identify all the individuals within this class
and to provide cost-efficient ways to enable them to purchase the tapes and
devices they need on a royalty-free basis. 19 2 Therefore, home taping
royalties unfairly disadvantage this class of audio recording device and
blank tape consumers.
Other classes of consumers who are disadvantaged by a home taping
royalty system are the computer industry and computer consumers.' 93
Computers often use the identical blank digital tape as digital audio
recorders for a recording medium on which to store computer software
and data." g' A surcharge on blank tapes disadvantages this class of
audio tapes in furtherance of the same goals, although they may not seek to publish their
musical ideas.
190. Professional and amateur musicians and composers often buy very expensive
recording devices. Some of these devices are specialized, e.g., four, eight, and sixteentrack analog and digital recorders which can record four, eight, and sixteen tracks of
musical information on a blank cassette, respectively, unlike "standard" cassette recorders
which record on only two tracks. Others buy very expensive "standard" recording
devices. These devices, whether specialized or standard, are essential to their artistic
efforts, chosen occupation, or hobby. These devices can also be used by nonmusicians
for high quality home taping or regular listening. A surcharge on these devices will result
in a disproportionate share of the home taping royalty being paid by a noninfringing class
of individuals. Indeed, since they do not contribute to the home taping p-oblem, these
individuals should not have to pay a royalty at all.
191. See Ginsburg, Reforms, supra note 5, at 97. For example, "broadcasters,
professional producers of audio and audiovisual works, and organizations aiding the
aurally and visually handicaped are entitled to reimbursement from the collection societies
for the royalties paid on the blank tape." Id. (citing Law of July 3, 1985, art. 37).
192. An exemption scheme requires that these individuals be recognized as exempt, and
enabled to purchase tapes without the additional charge. It would be very difficult to
institute and administer a system that recognizes all the individuals within the class.
193. See Compromise Bill on Home Taping, supra note 2, at 614-15. Note that while
noninfringing consumers (those who do not tape copyrighted sound recordings, but buy
cassette machines to listen to prerecorded cassettes) are not excluded from paying the
y
oya
y
Toyalty. The Audio Home Recording Azk of 1992 has an exempivM %T
17 U.S.C. § 1001(4)(B)(ii), and microphone-only recording devices, i.e., dictaphones.
This in part protects some within the noninfringing class. 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3)(B).
194. See Compromise Bill on Home Taping, supra note 2, at 614-15 (citing testimony
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consumers by requiring it to pay for the home taping of copyright
protected recordings in which they do not participate. Similarly, blind
individuals use blank audio tape in ways that do not infringe the copyright
interests of others. This class of consumers records audio letters and
talking books on digital and analog tape. A surcharge on such tape, or
recording devices, is unfair to this otherwise disadvantaged class.
Although legislative schemes may exempt these individuals from a home
taping royalty,"'5 it is unlikely that such plans could be efficiently
implemented.
V. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY IS INADEQUATE AS THE SOLE
JUSTIFICATION FOR A HOME TAPING ROYALTY

Based on the foregoing discussion it is clear that the traditional
common law copyright principle-economic efficiency-is inadequate as
the sole justification for a home taping royalty.196 This is due in part to
the problematic nature of using economics as a means of measuring social
welfare.t 97
Also, the shortcomings of home taping royalties, both
practical' 98 and theoretical, 99 expose the conflicting interests of copyright
owners and consumers, which cannot be reconciled using economic
efficiency alone. These inadequacies indicate that the copyright owners'
moral rights must be considered in the home taping royalty analysis. In
fact, there is already a move toward recognizing author's rights in the
copyright jurisprudence of common law countries. This is a "natural"
response because of the difficulty of balancing the conflicting interests of
copyright owners and consumers that have been exposed through changing
technology. Therefore, the common law world should cease trying to
justify proposed home taping royalty schemes using the principle of
economic efficiency alone and formally embrace the concept of rights. 20,
of Philip Greenspun (research assistant with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology),
to the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Oct. 29, 1991).
Although the 1992 AHRA exempts digital audio recording media marketed primarily for
the purpose of computer and database use, 17 U.S.C. § 1001(4)(B)(ii), such an exemption
is problematic because there is often no distinction in the market place between digital
computer and audio tapes.
195. Contra 17 U.S.C. § 1001(4)(B)(ii).
196. See Yen, supra note 21, at 539.
197. See id.
198. See supra notes 166-95 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 140-65 and accompanying text.
200. It is interesting to note that the proponents of the Audio Home Recording Act of
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As home taping royalty schemes are viewed as necessary to balance the
interests of copyright owners and consumers-which they should be-they
must be justified using both the principles of economic efficiency and
author's rights.2"'
A. Economic Analysis Insufficient
The problems of using economic analysis to measure social welfare
weigh against justifying a home taping royalty only in terms of economic
efficiency.20 2 The theoretical limitations of Paretianism and Wealth
Maximization described above make them improper to determine a socially
beneficial level of copyright protection using economic analysis alone.20 3
When a home taping royalty is analyzed using these two concepts, it
becomes clear that imposing a fee to purchase blank audio tape and
recording devices needs further justification.
1. Pareto Noncomparability
Upon analyzing a home taping royalty using Paretianism, one finds
a situation of pareto noncomparability. That is, a home taping royalty is
neither pareto superior nor pareto inferior to the status quo-no home
taping royalty."' Where there is a situation of pareto noncomparability,
Paretianism does not support a preference of one protection scheme over
another.20 ' Since a home taping royalty presents a situation of pareto
noncomparability when compared to having no home taping royalty,

1992 justified the royalty on blank tape and devices using the efficiency theory-provide
a fund from which owners can be compensated and encouraged to create more works-but
excluded analog recording devices and tape from the royalty scheme. See supra notes
117-27 and accompanying text. Currently, analog recording devices and tape are by far
more popular than digital audio tape, and account for a much larger portion of the market.
Why not include analog recording devices and tape in the royalty, and thereby provide a
larger collected royalty and incentive to create? Perhaps the exclusion is due in part to
the feeling that this issue involves a balancing of individual rights-owner's and
consumer's-and is not motivated solely by society's interest in the distribution of sound
recordings.
201. Yen, supra note 21, at 538.
202. Id. at 539.
203. See supra notes 152-65 and accompanying text.
204. See Yen, supra note 21, at 540.

205. Id.
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another principle must justify changing the status quo and imposing a fee
for purchasing blank audio tape or recording devices.
A home taping royalty is neither pareto superior nor inferior to having
no royalty because it will increase the welfare of copyright owners while
decreasing the welfare of consumers. 206 As was stated earlier, it is not
disputed that a home taping royalty will increase the welfare of composers,
musicians, and producers by increasing the amount of money they receive
for their sound recordings. This effect of the royalty is viewed as a
positive factor in determining whether the royalty is appropriate.
However, such a royalty will greatly affect the rights of noninfringing
consumers. It cannot be denied that a home taping royalty will unfairly
affect numerous musicians, computer users, blind individuals, and other
innocent purchasers of blank audio tape and recording devices by requiring
them to pay a fee to purchase such equipment. In this situation, the
principle of Paretianism gives no guidance in determining the proper way
to resolve the conflict between copyright owners and consumers.
Therefore, in deciding whether to impose a home taping royalty on
consumers, another justification must be advanced.
2. Wealth May Not Be Maximized
Wealth Maximization is often suggested as the most appropriate way
of determining the proper level of copyright protection. 20 7 Given the
appeal of the concept, it is not surprising that many common law nations
seek to justify a level of protection using this method of economic
analysis. 2 8 However, when a home taping royalty is analyzed using
Wealth Maximization it becomes evident that the concept is inadequate as
the sole justification for imposing a fee for purchasing blank audio tape
and recording devices.
In particular, it is extremely difficult to make an accurate Wealth
Maximization determination with respect to a home taping royalty. This
determination requires information that is impossible to obtain. For
instance, an accurate determination requires that all possible uses, and
classes of consumers, of blank audio tape and recording devices be
identified. 2°9 This information will enable the legislature to predict the
effect a royalty will have on consumer behavior. Further, an accurate
206. See generally id. at 539-40 (describing the situation of Pareto nioncomparability).
207. See id. at 541.
208. Id. at 545.
209. See Yen supra note 21, at 542.
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determination of the royalty's incentive effects and the frequency of home
taping is needed to determine how authors will behave under a royalty
system."' 0 While much has been said concerning the answers to these
problems, little has been proved.21 '
The use of Wealth Maximization to analyze a home taping royalty is
particularly problematic because of a number of faulty assumptions on
which the economic efficiency theory is based. With respect to home
taping royalties, the first assumption of economic efficiency is that there
is a causal relationship between a royalty payment and the creation and
dissemination of sound recordings. In other words, the increased sales of
blank audio tape has caused the loss in sales of LPs, CDs, and cassettes.
As a result of the decrease in sales of LPs, CDs, and cassettes, authors
will not produce as many new sound recordings. 12 Further, this reduction
in creative effort decreases societal welfare and necessitates a home taping
royalty. While the first part of the relationship cannot be argued, i.e., that
there has been an increase in sales of blank audio tape, the remainder of
the assumption is suspect.

The home taping literature lacks convincing

evidence of a causal relationship between increased sales of blank audio
tape and decreased sales of LPs, CDs, and cassettes.

While there may be some causal connection between the increased
sales of blank audio tape and decreased sales of prerecorded music, it has

210. See id. at 543.
211. See, e.g., George L. Priest, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers, in 8 RESEARCH
IN LAW & ECONOMICS 19 (John Palmer & Richard 0. Zerbe eds., 1986). Professor
Priest writes:
The ratio of empirical demonstration to assumption in this literature must be
very close to zero .... The inability of economists to resolve the question of
whether activity stimulated by the . . . protection of intellectual property
enhances or diminishes social welfare implies, unfortunately, that economists
can tell lawyers ultimately very little about how to enforce or interpret the law
of intellectual property.
Id. at 19-21.
212. Beverly Sills, as chairperson of the Coalition to Save America's Music, stated that
the "home taping of music has resulted in fewer new releases of records, and as a direct
result, fewer opportunities for new talent." See Diverse Groups Ask Supreme Court to
Review Decision Blocking Home Video Recording, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No.
101, at A-I, May 25, 1982. The author doubts the validity of this statement given the rise
in new record labels within the past few years. It appears that more new talent has
emerged on these new labels as a result of the music industry's failure to adapt to
changing tastes. See generally FREDERIC DANNEN, Hi-T MEN 85-110 (1991).
Moreover, both proponents and opponents of home taping royalties admit that the
statistical evidence on the incentive effects of such schemes are suspect at best. See
McKuin, supra note 4, at 332-33 n. 110.
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not been proven that the alleged $1.9 billion loss in sales per year is
totally because of home taping.213 Some argue that a large part of the loss
in sales is because of the ever-changing taste of the public 21 4 and the
failure of the large record companies to keep pace with that change. Also,
there is no proof that the lack of a home taping royalty has caused a
decrease in opportunity for new talent. As a result of the traditional
215
difficulty in getting a recording contract with a large record company
and the failure of many of the larger companies to recognize viable new
talent, many composers, musicians, and producers are turning to
independent record companies and personal promotional efforts to get their
music to the public.21 6 Although this is difficult, and may not account for
a substantial part of the music industry, it affords the opportunity to
distribute sound recording to the public. Therefore, even without a home
taping royalty, the often stated goal of copyright law in common-law
nations-encouraging creation and dissemination of works of art-is
ensured.
The second assumption lies in the incentive effects of copyright
protection. It is assumed that the leading incentive to produce artistic
works is economic reward, and without that incentive fewer works would
be produced and distributed and society would suffer. This assumption is
critical to the economic efficiency principle of copyright, as works are
given protection because protection is a "prerequisite" to creation.
However, a careful look at authorship shows that copyright protects works
whose creation does not depend on the economic incentive of copyright.217
Copyright protects the works authored by students in fulfilling their
academic requirements,2 ' as well as works which are the result of an

213. In fact, there are many reasons why the record industry is losing money. High
overhead and poor artist development are partly to blame, along with "promotional
expenditures." See DANNEN, supra note 212, at 85-110.
214. See Diverse GroupsAsk Supreme Courtto Review Decision Blocking Home Video
Recording, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), No. 101, A-1 (May 25, 1982).
215. This situation predates the home taping controversy.
216. Although producing and distributing sound recordings without large record
companies is very difficult, many new acts produce records and distribute their own work.
The obstacles are formidable, distribution networks are often controlled by the larger
record companies, and promotion by radio stations is difficult to obtain. See generally
DANNEN, supra note 212.
217. See Yen, supra note 21, at 520, 537.
218. For example, in the United States, there is no exclusion for academic works. See
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (amended 1990) (including works of the mind as copyrightable). See
also Yen, supra note 21, at 537 n.133.
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"accident." 21 9 Copyright even protects works that an author may be
compelled to create. 220 Because these works would be created without
protection, a literal reading of the economic efficiency principle of
copyright would require that those works, and all others which would be
produced without copyright, not be given protection. 221 The common law
world's failure to exclude such works from copyright protection indicates
that there is some other underlying justification for copyright protection.
Even if the forgoing assumption were true, it ignores other factors
that induce artistic effort, and makes economic analysis insufficient as the
sole determinative factor for expanding copyright protection. Other
incentives do exist, and although they are not in themselves determinative,
they at least need to be considered in the home taping decision. For
example, one of the primary incentives to write, record, and distribute
music is the pleasure derived from the effort. Many musicians, and
struggling producers, continue to write and record music on their own
despite the cost and low economic reward.222 If there is already an
incentive to create music, is a home taping royalty necessary? Although
there is a strong argument for enacting a home taping royalty
notwithstanding other incentives to produce, the royalty cannot be justified
using economic efficiency alone.
B. It's About Rights
A solution to the home taping problem must be based on principles
other than economic efficiency. Perhaps imposing a home taping royalty
is proper to balance the interests of owners and consumers. That is, in
balancing the conflicting interests of copyright owners and users, the
interests of the owner are deemed more important than those of the
219. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir.
1951). The court stated that, "a copyist's bad eyesight of defective musculature, or a
shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently distinguishable variations.
Having hit upon such a variation unintentionally, the 'author' may adopt it as his and
copyright it." Id. (emphasis added).
220. See Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Dir. Co. of Minn., 770 F.2d 128, 132 (8th
Cir. 1985) (the court found "nothing in the Copyright Act to support the District Court's
conclusion that [plaintiff] Hutchinson's directory is excluded from copyright protection on
the ground that Hutchnison is required by law to publish a directory").
221. Using the economic efficiency rationale one could argue that such works should
be excluded because they will be created without copyright, and charging a price for them
would be unduly burdensome to society.
222. Many bands make sound recordings and promote their music through concert
tours even though they do not earn a profit. See generally DANNIN, supra note 212.
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consumer because the owner's property is being taken without appropriate
compensation. This justification is based on natural law-copyright
protection is justified because of the labor and artistic contributions of the
musician, composer, and producer.223 Countering this argument, Wendy
Gordon writes the following:
There is often a distrust of copyright when its
compulsions conflict with the usual expectations people
have of the freedoms they should be entitled to exercise
In everyday
over their physical possessions.
experience, when people who buy records, video
cassettes, and computer programs are told not to use
their own home machines to make copies of them, or
when radio listeners are told it might be unlawful for
them to tape music off the air, there is often a feeling
of unfair restriction. . . . In addition, an act of copying
seems to harm no one.224

Gordon's statement highlights the fact that there is an underlying conflict
of individual interests involved. To charge consumers to use lawfully
purchased sound recording in a private way-copying the sound recording
for personal enjoyment-must be to assert the author's rights over the
consumers' because economic efficiency alone cannot reconcile these
interests. This conflict was recognized when Parliament enacted the 1985
French home taping law. In deciding not to prohibit home taping,
Parliament recognized the right of the public to make personal copies of
lawfully purchased sound recordings.1 5 At the same time, it recognized
the right of an author to receive appropriate compensation from the
unauthorized reproduction of the author's work.226 Parliament balanced
the competing interests using the natural law basis of author's rights. Jane
Ginsburg observes:
The legislators recognized that 'it no longer seem[ed] possible to
call into question the right of individuals to reproduce works of
authorship by means of existing technology.' On the other hand,

223. Yen, supra note 21, at 522-24.
224. Gordon, supra note 32, at 1345-46.
225. See Ginsburg Reforms, supra note 5, at 95.

226. See id.
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it had become clear that home taping should no longer be free of
remuneration to the authors of the works recorded.227
This underlying use of author's rights is not surprising given the history
of copyright law in the civil law world, and the current trend in
recognizing the natural law aspect of copyright.
C. Presence of Natural Law

Although copyright protection in the common law world is supposedly
guided by society's interest in economic efficiency, a number of scholars
have argued that natural law, or author's rights, should actually motivate
the principles of copyright protection.228 Further, there has been a trend
on the part of common law nations to accept the natural law justification
of copyright in accordance with certain international treaty obligations.229
Gary Kauffman has claimed that the common law world's reliance on
economic efficiency is suspicious. 20 Kauffman points to five "historical
accidents" through which the common law principle of economic
efficiency was developed.2 3' First, the English common law courts were

227. Id. (citing J.O. D6bats, Assembl6e Nationale, First Session of June 28, 1984, at
3825).
228. Some even argue that there is a great deal of evidence pointing to the presence
of natural law in the copyright jurisprudence of common law countries. See, e.g.,
Kauffman, supra note 15, at 387-420 (contending that the common law world's reliance
on economic efficiency is a series of historical accidents); see, e.g., Yen, supra note 21,
at 519-39 (examines the presence of natural law in modern copyright); see, e.g., Gordon,
supra note 32, at 1343-50 (contending that natural rights are the basis for copyright).
229. See Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary and Artistii Works, art. i
(as revised July 24, 1971), reprintedin U.N. EDUC., ScI. & CULTURAL ORG. & WORLD
INTELL. PROP. ORG., COPYRIGHT LAND AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1990)
[hereinafter Berne Convention).
230. See Kauffman, supra note 15, at 381-88.
231. See id. at 387-419. As Kauffman explains:
Copyright rhetoric speaks of encouraging authorship; and yet, it has never been
suggested that any legislator ever proposed a copyright bill because "authors
were not simply writing enough." Moreover, neither Congress nor Parliament
has ever passed copyright legislation due to an actual decline in book
production. To be sure, most copyright legislation appears when there is a
massive invasion of the natural right: plagiarism, unauthorized performance,
and literary and record piracy are prime examples. Thus, when one considers
that copyright is a natural right, and that the evils that incite copyright
legislation are invasions of that right, then the purpose of a copyright statute
appears to be codification of the right-primarily for the author.
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unable to define copyright protection
before
VIII proclaimed a
26
32
Ti Henry
nb
This inability, along with the
"royal prerogative" for printing.
Stationers' power to control printing and avoid purely legal solutions to
their problems, kept the courts from even hearing copyright cases. 233 It
is argued that, but for the fact of the royal prerogative, the courts would
have chosen to recognize an author's property right in the works
created. 234

The second "accident" occurred with the enacting of the first
copyright statute. Although the Statute of Anne stated a public purpose,
viz., "An Act for the Encouragement of Learning," those urging its
enactment would in fact do so to protect the interest of private rights. 35
The wording may have only been decorative, or may have been a way of
justifying the "monopoly" given to the Stationers' Company. 36 Either
way, copyright protection was guided by recognizing and protecting the
rights of authors and producers (Stationer's Company), not the interest of
society.
After the Statute of Anne became law, the common law courts began
to decide copyright cases. The third "accident" was that in early
copyright cases there was no distinction made between the issues of
whether copyright was "property" and, if it was, whether it was
perpetual.237 That is, the issues were fused, i.e., "if property, then
perpetual. 238 Early courts, holding that copyright was not property, were
guided in part by the notion that protection would have to be perpetual if
copyright was property. 239 Because granting perpetual rights was viewed

Id. at 387.
232. See id. at 389 & n.29 (citing Morris, The Origins of the Statute of Anne, 12
COPYRIGHT L. SymP. (ASCAP) 222, 237 (1962).
233. See H. RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT STATUTE 20-21 (1956).
234. See Kauffman, supra note 15, at 389-90.
235. See id. at 392. Kauffman states that: "[slince copyrights are only product
monopoly, that is, property rights, the preamble ought to have clearly reflected the
primacy of such individual rights; a public purpose title is appropriate in antitrust
legislation, not copyright laws." Id. at 397.
236. Id. at 392.
237. Id. at 398.
238. Id.
239. See, e.g., Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769);
Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (H.L. 1774).
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as undesirable, copyright was, therefore, not deemed to be property.
Thus, a natural law basis for copyright was rejected.240
The fourth "accident" was that despite current copyright
jurisprudence, an explicit recognition of an author's rights is, in fact,
recognized241 in the Empowering Clause of the United States
Constitution. 242 Because the framers of the Constitution were acquainted
with the Statute of Anne, the wording of the Constitution may be based on
the second "accident"-the wording of the Constitution may only be
decorative.243 Also, many of the proposed wordings of the Copyright
Clause made no mention of economic efficiency or a public purpose
behind copyright and, in fact, recognized author's rights. 24" Further,
because the Patent Clause, which read "To encourage, by proper
premiums and provisions, the advancement of useful knowledge and
discoveries," was introduced concurrently with the Copyright Clause,24
the framers may have been unconcerned with the language and thought it
best to fuse the two together, which they did.2 46 Additionally, the
individual writings of some of the framers indicate that the "primacy of
society's interest in fostering [copyrighted works] is simultaneously
advanced by giving economic reward, and therefore incentive, to
authors."247 Finally, after Wheaton v. Peters,248 the Copyright Act of
1909 codified the primacy of society's interest in works of authorship and
formally rejected copyright as a natural right, hence the fifth "accident." 249
This "accident" occurred in spite of the lack of literature supporting the
view of the primacy of society's interest in copyrighted works.250

240. See Kauffman, supra note 15, at 397-402.
241. See id. at 403.
242. U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl.8.
243. See Kauffman, supra note 15, at 403.
244. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 321 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
245. Kauffman, supra note 15, at 404-05 (emphasis added).
246. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
247. Kauffman, supra note 15, at 406.
248. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (holding that copyright did not exist at common law
but was rather created by statute). The court relied on Donaldson, 98 Eng. Rep. 257
(H.L. 1774), which had a similar holding.
249. See Kauffman, supra note 15, at 409-11.
250. See id. at 411. Kauffman claims that the rejection of copyright as a natural right,
and the promotion of society's interest in the Copyright Act of 1909, was motivated by
the fear of monopoly, perpetuity confusions, and patent confusion. Id.
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Other authors have noted similar challenges to the traditional
economic efficiency theory of common law copyright. Professor Jane
Ginsburg claims that early references to an author's property interest and
the public's interest in the advancement of knowledge are "separate
considerationsof equal weight."25 ' Whatever the conclusion, it is clear that
there is a basis for the argument that natural law, or author's rights, has
a place in the common law copyright jurisprudence. Therefore, economic
efficiency need not be the sole justification for any type of copyright
protection and, in this instance, a home taping royalty.
Further evidence of the common law world's growing acceptance of
the natural law view of copyright is found in recent adherence to the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
("Convention"). 2 Article I of the Convention states its purpose as "a
Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their literary and
artistic works. "253 The American, British, Australian, and Irish adherence
to the Convention indicates implicit legislative recognition of the natural

251. See Ginsburg, Two Copyrights, supra note 27, at 999 (emphasis added).
Ginsburg writes the following:
Sources chronologically closer to the Constitution, however, treat the private and
While records from the Constitutional
public interests more even-handedly.
Convention concerning the [Clopyright [Cllause are extremely sparse, a document
dated August 18, 1787, notes that the proposed legislative powers were submitted
to the Committee of Detail: "To secure to literary authors their copy rights for a
limited time. To encourage by proper premiums and provisions the advancement of
useful knowledge and discoveries." The referral to the Committee of Detail thus
sets forth the author's property interest ("their copy rights") and the public interest
in advancement of knowledge as separate considerations of equal weight. Similarly,
in The Federalist Papers, Madison endorsed the [Clopyright [Cilause, asserting,
"[tihe public good fully coincides in both cases [of patents and copyrights] with
claims of individuals."

Id.
252. Berne Convention, supra note 229, art. 1.

253. Id.
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law dimension of copyright protection.25 4 Therefore, again, economic
efficiency need not be the sole justification for copyright protection.
VI. CONCLUSION

While home taping royalty schemes are appropriate mechanisms to
balance the interests of copyright owners and users, there are numerous
problems associated with their use which make economic efficiency
Home taping royalties are an
inadequate as their sole justification.
inefficient means to resolve the conflict between copyright owners and
A home taping royalty unfairly restricts the rights of
consumers.
noninfringing consumers of blank audio tape and recording devices.
Moreover, these royalty schemes do not comport with the traditional
common law economic efficiency principle. Further, there is evidence of
a presence of natural law rights in traditional common law copyright
jurisprudence. Given all these shortcomings, it is necessary to justify a
home taping royalty using more than the economic efficiency principle of
copyright in common law countries. Such a royalty can, and must, be
justified using both the economic efficiency principle of the common law
world and the author's rights principle of the civil law world.

254. For a more complete discussion of natural law references in United States law,
see Yen, supra note 21, at 537 n.136. Professor Yen writes
[Tihe Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 . . . eliminated certain

formal prerequisites to copyright protection. In particular, notice of copyright
is no longer required to keep a work from falling into the public domain.
Although minor, such a change suggests a natural law orientation because it
seemingly codifies the notion that copyright is the inevitable consequence of an
author's creative labor. This orientation is further supported by article one of
the Berne Convention, which states, "The countries to which this Convention
applies constitute a Union for the protection of the rights of authors in their
literary and artistic works." [emphasis addedl Adherence to such language
certainly implies recognition of the fact that something more than economic
convenience supports copyright.
Yen, supra note 21, at 537 n.136 (citations omitted).

